AFRICA CONSUMER FUND

August 2016

Fund Description

The Africa Consumer Fund invests in the top-15 sustainable listed consumer-related companies in Africa (ex-South Africa). The fund aims to provide investors with active equity exposure to the growing consumer African markets within a sustainable investment framework at relatively low cost. Stock selection is informed by detailed in-situ company due diligence with an emphasis on financial quality, robust corporate governance, and environmental and social operating environments.

Fund Information

Launch date:	01 March 2013
Fund AUM:	USD 8.0m
Firm AUM:	USD 111.3m
Structure:	Open-ended, Expert Fund
Domicile:	Mauritius
Regulator:	FSC Mauritius
Fund Manager:	Sustainable Capital Ltd
Administrator:	Apex Fund Services (MU)
Global Custodian:	HSBC Bank (MU)
Auditor:	Ernst & Young
Dealing frequency:	Monthly
Bloomberg:	SCAFCFA MP Equity
ISIN:	MU0387S00003
GIIN:	2FPFLK.99999.SL.480
Reporting currency:	USD
Base Fee:	2.0%
Performance Fee:	None
Contact:	info@sustainablecapital.mu

Fund Performance (USD, GIPS*, Since inception)



Cumulative Relative Performance (USD, GIPS*, Since Inception)



Geographic Spread (% Economic Footprint)



Monthly Performance (%, USD, GIPS*)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Calendar
2013			1.4	-1.5	5.8	-9.1	1.5	-4.1	8.5	8.5	-0.6	0.1	9.5
2014	-2.3	2.2	0.5	3.1	1.8	4.6	1.3	-1.3	1.4	-2.4	-2.5	-0.7	5.4
2015	-4.8	-3.8	-0.5	4.3	-1.3	-1.7	-6.5	-3.2	3.0	-2.0	-3.9	-0.1	-19.2
2016	-8.0	0.9	5.6	4.9	3.9	-8.7	-4.1	-7.8					-13.7

Sector Spread



Annualized Performance (%, USD, GIPS*)

	-1 yr	-3 yr (ann)	-5 yr (ann)	Since Inception
Africa Consumer	-16.4	-4.9	na	-6.0
S&P Pan Africa Ex-SA	-5.5	-10.2	na	-9.6
Relative Perf.	-10.8	5.3	na	3.5

Relative Risk and Return (USD, GIPS*, Since Inception)

Portfolio Beta	0.50
Correlation	0.49
Tracking Error	11.8%
Information Ratio	0.30
Relative Downside Std. Deviation	7.0%
Sortino Ratio	0.50

Fund Manager Comments

Kenya scores an economic 'own goal': A basic tenet of free market ideology is that competitive forces are the most efficient mode of setting prices. There are notable exceptions to this rule, such as monopolies or oligopolies, where industry concentration allows companies to profiteer at the expense of consumers. In these cases, there is clearly a need for regulatory intervention. Kenya's banking industry, with 43 competitors, cannot possibly fall into this category. Nevertheless, public perception is that commercial banks have been ripping off their customers with exorbitantly high loan rates. The reality is that the Kenyan government must bear responsibility for the country's structurally high interest rates, having driven up domestic bond yields through excessive borrowing (ironically, the government issued 10-year sovereign bonds at a yield of 15.0% on the same day that it capped bank interest rates at 14.5%). Populist calls for interest regulation have been a national sport in Kenya, although previous attempts were sensibly rebuffed under the Moi and Kibaki eras. The most recent campaign was opportunistically timed in a pre-election year and President Kenyatta scored an 'own goal' for Kenya's economy by caving into parliamentary pressure by unilaterally approving the law in a move that saw political expediency trump economic common sense.

Kenya's blue-chip commercial banks have declined in value by over 50% from their 2-year highs (and by over 60% on a price to book ratio basis). More than half of this value destruction can be directly ascribed to the recent regulatory surprise. The principal objective of our recent research trip in Kenya was therefore to get a better understanding of the net financial impact of the recently published interest rate regulations, both at a company and an industry (systematic) level. After a week of interviews with the banks and other stakeholders, our assessment of the interest rate regulation is as follows: **a) The good news (long-term):** The law in its current form is clearly unsustainable in the long run and is likely to be repealed or diluted as the full, unintended, economic consequences of the regulations become evident (including small bank failures, job losses, severe credit contraction, SME bankruptcies, capital flight, currency losses and GDP headwinds); **b) The bad news (short-term):** Given the political climate, it will be incredibly difficult for the President to row back on his decision to sign the bill into law in the short-term. It seems foolhardy to bet on a near-term reversal before the conclusion of the national elections.

2017 is likely to be a lost year of earnings growth for Kenyan banks (due to regulated net interest margin compression that will be practically impossible to fully recover through other revenue lines) and this may drag on into 2018 (given the decision-making stalemates that tend to follow elections in Kenya). The lack of material regulatory detail at this stage means that we need to ask ourselves the existential questions pertinent to the longer-term investment case for Kenya's banks: Can the industry itself survive under this law? Is it economically feasible for the regulation to persist in perpetuity? What are the full unintended consequences of the law under this scenario? Which banks are likely to survive and ultimately prosper as a consequence of industry consolidation? In combination with the findings of our detailed company research, the answers to these questions leave us well-positioned to take advantage of any mispricing opportunities that emerge over the next year.